In recent years, a large amount of research has been conducted for the cooperative control and design of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that work together to accomplish complex missions such as persistent surveillance. This paper addresses a law enforcement scenario, where the goal is to maximize the situational awareness over an area. In order to achieve this goal, a ground station (base) sends a group of autonomous UAVs to the field, and the UAVs broadcast the monitored information back to the base through multi-hop communications. Typically, the UAVs need to return to the base for refueling in long-run missions. Whenever a UAV returns to the base, the remaining vehicles on the field may require a relocation to avoid any communication loss. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to identify the influential design variables (i.e. impacting vehicle endurance) and control policies (i.e. aiding decisions about when to return and how to reconfigure) of UAVs on the mission performance as well as to investigate any trade-offs between them. The Monte Carlo simulations indicate that velocity and radius of communication are more influential on the situational awareness than the fuel capacity. Moreover, the influence of fuel capacity is more reduced as the connectivity recovery strategies are utilized by the UAVs.
I. Introduction
In recent years, a large amount of research has been conducted for the cooperative control and design of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that work together to accomplish complex missions such as persistent surveillance [1] [2] [3] , environmental monitoring [4] , target tracking [5] , or several others. Since the beginning of UAV flight, there has always been an interest in the military applications of UAVs that can effectively operate in dirty, dull, or dangerous missions. In addition, the range of civil UAV applications is getting wider as the new technologies advance performance, computation capability, and affordability of these vehicles. For instance, the authors of [6] categorize the UAV civil missions with respect to four purposes, namely land management, commercial, earth science, and security. Under the security, there are also sub-purposes such as patrolling, law enforcement, disaster operations, search and rescue, and fire detection.
In the fall of 2004, a UAV system was used to gather and record real-time video imagery for a small community police department in South Mississippi, and the author of [7] emphasizes a major benefit of this UAV system as getting reliable data at low cost. Moreover, the author of [8] presents a survey of UAVs in traffic surveillance and describes the UAVs as "bird's eye view" for road conditions and emergency response. Alternatively, the authors of [9] present a tactical law enforcement scenario as a prospective UAV mission in the future national air space system, and they foresee UAVs that can self-detect/avoid other aircrafts and send dynamic updates about the suspicious activity to the ground station. As depicted, UAVs have the potential to be more active in law enforcement missions of the future. While they are providing great benefits for practicality, safety, and cost, there exist many technical issues that require a deep investigation. For instance, some major research questions that have recently attracted many researchers are as follows:
-How to provide autonomy? Autonomy is foreseen as a major specification in future systems to provide operations without any (or as small as possible) human interaction. As such, a UAV is expected to achieve the mission objectives by making decisions based on the sensed information. Here, some of the critical issues include, but are not limited to, defining objective functions aligned with the mission, developing efficient on-board computations, or ensuring reliable sensed data.
-How to design efficient vehicle/mission? The design of the vehicle and the mission plays an important role for effective operations. Particularly, a UAV in a law enforcement scenario potentially requires 1) maximum endurance to extend the duration of loiter over a field, 2) optimal flight altitude for better quality images with a sufficiently large monitored area, and 3) effective sensors for reliable communications with other vehicles. However, one way to maximize endurance is increasing the fuel capacity of the vehicle, which possibly degrades the vehicle agility. Moreover, reducing the flight altitude of a UAV increases the quality of image acquired whereas it degrades the aerodynamics efficiency, decreases the monitored area, and requires air traffic control. Finally, reliable and long distance communication can be provided by carrying powerful antennas but they are in general heavy so it can cause a reduction in the fuel capacity due to an increase in payload. Furthermore, even though an optimal vehicle is designed based on the aforementioned concerns, a group of optimal vehicles will result in an emergent behavior, which may not be easily predictable. As such, there exist many design compromises that need well-understanding for efficient operations.
-How to manage air traffic? Missions operated in urban environments, i.e a law enforcement scenario, require the management of the air traffic to avoid any collisions. As the number of aircrafts increase in the airspace, the complexity of the air traffic dramatically increases, and the air traffic control gets harder from a single authority. In this case, most recent studies investigate how to implement self-detection and avoidance systems to UAVs and how to integrate autonomous systems to the current air traffic.
In this paper, we introduce a law enforcement scenario conducted by a group of UAVs, whose major objective is to collect and stream-back sufficiently good quality data to the ground station as long as possible. To this end, we particularly focus on the first two aforementioned research questions pertaining to autonomy and vehicle/mission design, and we approach the problem from two perspectives, namely behavior and vehicle. From behavior perspective, we assume decentralized decision schemes that lead to autonomous UAVs communicating with the vehicles in their vicinity and making individual decisions based on locally gathered data. From vehicle perspective, we assume design trades among velocity, flight altitude, fuel capacity, and communication range that directly influence the fuel management of a UAV. Based on the scenario and the assumptions, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations that enable a design space exploration. We discuss the importance of some design variables related to the fuel management of a UAV and the connectivity of the communication network on the mission performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the persistent surveillance problem. Section III details the implementation of the case study, and Section IV depicts the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. Persistent Surveillance Problem via Multiple UAVs
This paper addresses a multi-UAV law enforcement scenario, where a group of collaborative UAVs operate over a field and send regular updates to the base regarding the points monitored. In this scenario, the main advantage of using UAVs is to collect reliable data in an affordable way. In an ideal case, if each point is monitored by an individual UAV that has endurance equal to the mission endurance, then the base collects the maximum amount of data about the field. However, it is important to consider that a UAV has an inherent possibility of leaving the group in long-run missions due to refuel/maintenance need, strategy change, or collision avoidance. Note that the removal of a UAV becomes a disturbance to the overall system, and it causes a degradation in situational awareness due to preventing the regular updates of some particular monitoring points. Therefore, some questions arise as how to maximize the stream-back data collected at the base under the disturbance of UAV removals? and which factors mitigate the degradation of situational awareness? In order to answer these questions, we formulate the surveillance problem via some graph theoretical concepts and model the UAVs and the base as individual agents.
A. Graph Theory Preliminaries
In this paper, we use definitions from graph theory to depict the surveillance scenario. Therefore, this section presents the terminology used throughout the paper. An undirected graph, G = (V, E), consists of a set of nodes, V , and a set of undirected edges, E. Let X be a subset of V . Then, G X refers to a subgraph induced by the nodes in X and their corresponding edges. In a graph, a k-length path, p, is a sequence of nodes (p 0 , p 1 , ..., p k ) such that the edge between any p i and p i+1 belongs to E. An undirected graph, G , is connected if there exists a path between any two nodes of the graph. The neighbor set of node v i , N v i , is the set including all adjacent nodes that are connected to v i .
(1)
The degree of v i is defined as the cardinality of N v i . The betweenness centrality of v i is equal to the number of shortest paths from all nodes to all others that pass through v i . Accordingly, if the betweenness centrality of v i is large, v i is likely to connect separate sets of nodes to each other.
B. Problem Formulation
The persistent surveillance problem studied in this paper is formulated according to the following assumptions: -Surveillance area: The surveillance area is assumed to be a connected graph, G * as in Figure 1 , where the nodes of the graph, shown as filled squares, represent the monitoring points, and the dotted edges represent the communication capability if two UAVs loiter over the corresponding nodes. Note that the monitoring points represent some incidents around a city, and some example incidents can be drug traffic, traffic accident, or a public event. In this respect, a law enforcement team determines a set of geographical positions (i.e. small areas or some coordinate points), where the UAVs fly towards to loiter over them to collect information about the incidents. Note that the term node is used henceforth to designate a monitoring point/area. Figure 1 : Surveillance area represented as a connected graph, G * .
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-Communication: Each UAV is assumed to have a limited communication range. Thus, a UAV can communicate with other UAVs if the distance between them is less than its communication range. Also, the distance between the base and at least one of the nodes is assumed less than the communication range of a UAV. Accordingly, at least one of the UAVs can directly communicate with the base if it monitors the corresponding node (e.g. the dotted edge between the base and the node in Figure 1 implies a direct communication if a UAV loiters over that node). For each UAV, the communication range is larger than its monitoring range. Moreover, the nodes of G * are assumed to be far from each other. Thus, if a UAV loiters in between two nodes, it cannot gather useful data from either of the nodes. Consequently, each UAV is urged to stay as close as possible to a single node of G * , and the communication network of the UAVs and the base becomes a subgraph of G * . When the communication network is connected, each UAV can broadcast information back to the base via multi-hop communication. For example, while UAV 4 in Figure 2a directly communicates with UAVs 2, 3, 5, and 6, it can indirectly communicate with UAV 1 and the base through UAV 2. On the other hand, Figure 2b shows a disconnected communication network due to the removal of UAV 4. In this respect, UAVs 3, 5, and 6 will be isolated from the group and no information will be reported to the base as long as they continue staying on their assigned loitering positions. In order to avoid such disconnections in the communication network, UAVs may move until the connectivity is recovered (e.g. moving towards each other or replacing the removed UAV).
-Autonomy: In this problem, we assume that the base assigns a node to each UAV whenever they return to base for refueling. In addition to the node assignments, the base can also control the UAVs in the face of an event or a disturbance as long as there exist direct or indirect communication among them. Nonetheless, the distance between the UAVs and the base is assumed large. The continuous wireless communication may not be always reliable and secure as discussed in [10] . Therefore, the UAVs are expected to make their own decisions for when to refuel and when to reconfigure based on their remaining fuel and other external events, respectively.
In this paper, the mission effectiveness is quantified through some utility functions. As such, let some utilities be defined for each UAV and the base. For each UAV, suppose that U i (t) denotes the utility of UAV i at time t. Note that (a) All UAVs can send data back to base due to having a connected communication network. a UAV has no utility if it is in cruise or refuel modes because it cannot monitor any useful data regarding an assigned node. As such, the utility of UAV i is defined as
Due to the assumption of limited communication capability, a UAV can stream back data if there exist a communication path between the base and itself. In addition to the utility of a UAV, an overall utility can be written for base as
where V c denotes the set of all UAVs that can communicate with the base directly or indirectly. Note that Eq. 3 represents the amount of information received by the base at time t. For instance, U in f o (t) in Figure 2a is the summation of all UAV utilities because all UAVs and the base are connected to each other, whereas U in f o (t) in Figure 2b is the summation of U 1 (t) and U 2 (t). Note that UAVs 3, 5, and 6 are loitering over the nodes and have individually nonzero utilities; however, they are not capable of sending the information back to the base because of the network disconnection. Such a case illustrates inefficient UAV operations that need to be avoided during a mission. Note that if a UAV loitering over node j cannot send its data back to the base due to the absence of a communication path (i.e. UAV 5 in Figure 2b ) or if there is no UAV loitering over node j (i.e. the unoccupied node in Figure 2b ), then the age of node j, α j (t), increases with respect to the base. Here, α j (t) is defined as the duration of time that the base has not received any data from node j, and it has the following equation:
if a UAV loitering over node j communicates with the base,
As seen from Eq. 4, α j (t) is a piecewise monotonically increasing function, and its increase implies a degradation in situational awareness for the base. Using the summation of node ages, a cost can be defined to quantify the degradation in situational awareness as
where V denotes the set of nodes in the surveillance area. Note that if there is no UAV on the field or there is no communication path among some UAVs and the base, C age (t) is a monotonically increasing function. Based on the depicted scenario, the overall objective function of this surveillance problem is
where T is the overall mission endurance. Note that minimizing J implies that the base collects the maximum amount of recent information during a mission. Here, one way to minimize J is via designing control policies for the base and the UAVs. A policy of the base is for assigning nodes to UAVs that have returned to base for refueling. A policy of a UAV is for making decisions about when to return to base and when to change nodes during the mission. In addition to designing policies, another way to minimize J pertains to the vehicle and mission designs because they greatly influence the fuel management of a vehicle. For instance, UAVs having different velocities or fuel capacities perform differently under a particular policy. Therefore, it is important to take into account the design specifications that impact the mission objective. Consequently, we break down the influential elements on minimizing Eq. 6 as in Figure 3 . 
C. Proposed Methodology
In this paper, the overall objective is to investigate the critical design and control variables that improve the situational awareness of a base about a surveillance area. By saying design variables, we mean the design specifications of a vehicle, whereas control variables pertain to the decision mechanisms utilized by UAVs and the base. In order to provide insight into the effects of these variables on the mission performance, one way is to conduct some experiments via Monte Carlo simulations. Accordingly, we propose a methodology for the analysis of persistent surveillance missions conducted by networked multi-UAV systems. The outline of the proposed methodology is shown in Figure 4 , and its first step is representing the surveillance area as a connected graph. The graph representation of a field is a rigorous way that captures not only the geographical positions of the monitoring points but also the feasibility of vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-base communications over the field. The second step is selecting a set of design variables that can capture the performance, aerodynamic, or propulsion related metrics and may have potential effect on the mission effectiveness. Then, the third step is identifying ranges to the design variables and creating the experiment cases accordingly. For a particular set of design variables, the resulting performance differs as UAVs use different types of control strategies. Therefore, the forth step of the proposed methodology is replicating the experiment cases for some control strategies in interest. Following that, the Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in the fifth step, and the final step pertains to the visualization of the simulation results to depict conclusions. In case of having insufficient conclusions, the design variables and the control strategies might require a modification. Hence, an iterated process may occur according to the steps of the methodology. 
III. Case Study Implementation
In this paper, we consider a scenario containing 6 monitoring zones, 6 identical UAVs, and a base. At each monitoring zone, we assume a threat occurring with a probability of 0.1. While a UAV is loitering over a particular zone, if a threat occurs then the UAV decreases its loitering altitude for detection. For a particular UAV, we denote the fuel consumptions of cruise, loiter at low altitude, and loiter at high altitude by ∆F cr , ∆F lt,low , and ∆F lt,high , respectively. Moreover, we assume that the fuel consumptions at different modes have the following order: ∆F cr > ∆F lt,low > ∆F lt,high . Finally, we assume that each UAV has a discrete dynamics with two degrees of freedom.
The persistent surveillance problem studied in this paper is a complex system-of-systems problem such that it involves a large number of input variables. In this case study, we have initially determined five major design variables, which are suspected to have a potential effect on the mission performance. The first variable is selected as the maximum velocity of a UAV, which directly affects the time spent in cruise mode. The second variable is chosen as the maximum fuel capacity of a UAV because it determines the overall endurance of the vehicle. The third variable is the radius of communication, which greatly impacts the topology of the overall communication network. Some topological metrics we take into account are average betweenness and average degree that vary with respect to the radius of communication. As the UAVs have larger communication radii, it is expected to observe a decrease in average betweenness (i.e. a UAV does not become a critical UAV to connect the base to other UAVs) and an increase in average degree (i.e. a UAV is likely to connect more UAVs). As a result, an increase in the radius of communication improves the connectivity of the network topology so the removal of a UAV due to refueling less likely causes a disconnection. The forth design variable is selected as the ratio of the fuel consumption at low altitude loiter to high altitude loiter (i.e. ). Note that a UAV loiters at high altitude for identifying objects. Whenever it identifies an object, it loiters at a lower altitude in order to detect it. Here, there is an underlying assumption that the required image qualities for detection and identification are different from each other so a UAV is required to change its loiter altitude to satisfy a desired image quality. Finally, the last variable is chosen as time to detect, which is the time spent for detection at low altitude loiter. In other words, it is the time duration a UAV is subjected to more drag, which increases the fuel consumption as a consequence. Note that the first two variables pertain to the vehicle specifications of a UAV, while the rest capture its sensor capabilities.
In addition to the aforementioned input variables, a control strategy utilized by a UAV is also an input to the system because it is directly related to the behavior of the vehicle. Note that UAV control we refer to in this paper is a highlevel control such that it does not pertain to the controller design driving the system from one state to another. Instead, we consider policies for UAVs to make high-level decisions. For instance, a UAV needs to utilize a refuel policy to ensure safe return to base without running out of fuel. Alternatively, a UAV requires a policy to maintain a connected communication network with the base under any disturbances. Likewise, many other policies can be executed by UAVs for efficient operations in a persistent surveillance mission. In this paper, we particularly focus on some refuel and connectivity policies of UAVs because they have a great impact on J.
A. Refuel Policies
A UAV is a valuable asset such that its crash due to running out of fuel is unacceptable. Therefore, a UAV utilizes a refuel policy to make a decision about when to safely return to base for refueling. In this work, we consider two refuel policies, namely deterministic and randomized. In the execution of both policies, a UAV is assumed to track its remaining fuel (F rem ), and it is able to compute the required fuel (F req ) to return to base from its current position at any time instant.
Deterministic Policy (π deterministic )
If a UAV utilizes the deterministic policy, it decides to return to base whenever it reaches a critical fuel threshold. Here, the critical fuel level (F cr ) is the required fuel to return to base from its current position, and it can be selected as F req + ε, where ε ≥ 0 is a non-negative scalar for buffer fuel. Accordingly, whenever F rem ≤ F cr = F req + ε, a UAV decides to return to base.
Randomized Policy (π randomized )
In this paper, the main feature of π randomized is that a UAV returns to base with a small probability even though it has not reached its critical fuel threshold. Let F cr and F th be the fuel thresholds corresponding to the critical fuel level and the fuel level triggering the randomization, respectively. Accordingly, the randomized policy suggests that a UAV returns to base with probability Pr return (w.p.Pr return ), if its remaining fuel level is less than F th (i.e. F rem ≤ F th ). Moreover, it returns to base certainly (w.p.1), if its remaining fuel is less than F cr . In this study, we select F th and Pr return as 3F cr and 0.01, respectively.
B. Connectivity Policies
As depicted in the preceding sections, a UAV in a persistent mission requires to return to base for refueling. In such cases, there is no guarantee that the communication network will stay connected after the UAV has left the surveillance area (e.g. the removal of UAV 4 in Figure 2b causes a disconnection in the network). Since the connectivity is essential for the base to collect information about the field, there should be a reconfiguration among the existing vehicles to recover connectivity in the face of a UAV removal. In literature, there are various strategies for the recovery of network connectivity (e.g. [11] , [12] , [13] ), one of which can be used as a connectivity policy in this problem.
Replacement Policy (π replace )
In this paper, we employ the message passing strategy (MPS) proposed in [13] as a connectivity policy for UAVs. As such, whenever a UAV leaves the field for refueling, the MPS suggests a sequence of replacements to ensure connectivity of the communication network. The advantage of using the MPS is to guarantee connectivity through some local operations requiring minimal amount of information. As a result of the MPS, UAVs on the field reconfigure themselves in a decentralized fashion through a sequence of replacements.
noReplacement Policy (π noReplace )
When a UAV executes the replacement policy, it may change the node it is loitering over according to the replacement request message received from another UAV. Changing the node, over which it is loitering, implies an extra time in cruise mode, so its overall endurance for loitering decreases. In order to understand the benefits of the replacement policy, the noReplacement policy is considered, where no replacements occur during a mission. Accordingly, whenever a UAV returns to base for refueling, the rest of the UAVs continue to loiter over their originally assigned nodes.
C. Node Assignment Policy (π base )
As illustrated in Figure 3 , the policy of the base for node assignments also plays an important role in the overall mission performance. Note that the base can track the ages of the nodes as shown in Eq. 4. In other words, the base counts the time steps that it has not gotten any information from a particular node (e.g. a node corresponding to an age of 0 implies that there exist a UAV loitering over that node and communicating with the base.) In this case study, we assume that the base executes a greedy strategy for the node assignment (i.e. it minimizes Eq. 5). Accordingly, whenever UAV i completes refueling at time t, the base creates a communication network from the UAVs on the field at time t. Based on the connectivity constraint, it then determines the feasible nodes it can assign UAV i to. Finally, the base assigns UAV i to the feasible point that has the maximum age.
D. Design of Experiments (DOE) Study
In order to create the experiment cases, a latin hyper cube design is used, and the ranges of the input variables are selected as illustrated in Table 1 . Since the output of each experiment case is a random variable, it is considered as a sample from the actual output distribution. Therefore, we conduct repeated simulations to demonstrate the expected performance of a particular input set. In this paper, the DOE size is selected 250. Each case in the DOE is repeated 15 times, each repetition is executed for 10000 time steps, and the expected outputs as shown in Table 1 are recorded accordingly. Moreover, all cases in the DOE are executed under 4 different UAV policies, which are generated by the combinations of two refuel and two connectivity policies. The control policies are illustrated in Table 2 , and the flow diagrams of each policy are presented in Figure 5 . Finally, a MATLAB script was written to conduct the DOE study.
For an individual control policy, each experiment case, which runs for 10000 time steps and repeated 15 times, took approximately 5 minutes on a 3.40GHz Intel Core i7 PC. The fuel consumption ratio of loiter at lower altitude over loiter at higher altitude 1-2.5 t detect
Number of time steps a UAV loiters at low altitude for detecting an object 3-12
Expected value of the average remaining fuel when returning
Expected value of the mean C age of the repetitions E[max(C age )] Expected value of the maximum C age of the repetitions
Expected value of the mean U in f o of the repetitions
Expected value of the ratio of detected objects over the overall threats Note that this study can be extended by using actual UAV data and higher order dynamics in the experiments to obtain more accurate results. However, the problem focused in this paper is a very complex problem, which is influenced by various factors. In order to obtain a general idea about the significant parameters in a computationally efficient way, we have preferred to conduct a low fidelity analysis.
IV. Results
As depicted in the preceding section, the DOE study is conducted for four different control policies, two of which utilize π randomized in the decision scheme. Note that π randomized causes UAVs to return to base even though they have not reached to a critical fuel threshold. To capture the degree of randomization, Figure 6 displays the distributions of the average fuel of UAVs when they first decide to return to base. The results show that the mean of the average return fuel is larger in randomized policies, while it gets slightly smaller with the policies utilizing replacements. We suspect that such a decrease is due to UAVs initiating the replacements but reaching a critical threshold without completing the replacements. In the simulations, such a UAV immediately decides to return to base to avoid any unsafe state. Consequently, a UAV may get further away from the base due to a replacement request and then decide to return to base, which causes extra fuel consumption. Note that ineffective replacements can be prevented by improving the policy such that if a UAV does not have enough fuel to replace a node then it does not accept the replacement request message. Based on the simulated cases, all of the policies exhibit similar means for the ratios of the detected objects over the total threats. The distributions of the mean ratios are displayed in Figure 7 , where slightly smaller means are observed with the policies without replacements. Such a result is expected because a UAV may not stream back information regarding the detected object due to the disconnection after a UAV removal.
One objective of the DOE study is to investigate any trends between the inputs and the outputs. Figures 8 and  9 show the scatter plots of the maximum cost (i.e. max t C age (t)) and the average utility (i.e.
, where T = 10000), respectively. As illustrated by the figures, trends between inputs and outputs do not vary with respect to different policies. Among the studied design variables, we observe that the velocity and the communication radius influence the outputs significantly. As the velocity and the communication radius increase, a desired outcome is observed, which is a decrease in the maximum cost and an increase in the average utility. Moreover, the maximum fuel capacity and the fuel consumption ratio have a greater impact on the average utility than the maximum cost.
An interesting result pertains to the highlighted asterisk points on Figures 8 and 9 . In particular, we see an iso- 
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The detection ratio Figure 7 : Distributions for the ratio of detected objects over the overall threats. lated set of points on the plots corresponding to the radius of communication for the deterministic&replacement and deterministic&no replacement policies. Note that these points are the DOE cases, where the velocity is mostly high, the fuel consumption ratio is strictly small, and the radius of communication is mostly small. We suspect that these cases are some outliers, thus the results cannot be generalized. In order to support this claim, we select some other points having high velocity, low fuel consumption ratio, and short communication range. In order to differentiate the points, we highlight them with filled triangles. As shown in Figures 8 and 9 , the cases highlighted with the triangles present coherent results with respect to the general trend whereas the cases highlighted with the asterisks indicate a huge jump on the outputs. Such a jump might be caused by some external factors that are not captured in this study. Note that we have initially determined five design variables, namely the velocity, the fuel capacity, the fuel consumption ratio, and the time to detect. The mean betweenness and the average degree are the topological metrics that are strongly correlated with the radius of communication. From the scatter plots, we observe that smaller mean betweeneess and larger average degree in a communication network are desired to maximize the utility and to minimize the cost. In the following plots, we will focus on the initial five design variables. Figures 10a, 10b, 10c, and 10d show the contour plots of the maximum cost with respect to the time to detect and the fuel consumption ratio. Based on the patterns, we observe that the maximum cost (i.e. corresponding to dark regions) is sensitive to the variations of fuel consumption ratio. In all policies, if the fuel consumption ratio is larger than some value, the maximum cost is increasing regardless of the changes in the time to detect. For instance, in case of fuel consumption ratio is close to the lower bound, varying time to detect does not significantly influence the output. Consequently, the results suggest that the fuel consumption ratio is a more significant factor on the maximum cost than the time to detect. Moreover, the plots show that utilizing replacement policy greatly reduces the maximum cost (i.e. reducing the dark regions), and utilizing the randomized policy degrades the achievable small cost (i.e. reduces white regions or increases gray regions). Figure 11 illustrates the contour plots of the average cost with respect to the maximum fuel capacity and the velocity. As expected, small velocity and low fuel capacity cause a large cost as depicted by dark patterns on the bottom left of Figures 11a, 11b, 11c , and 11d. An interesting result is the significance of velocity over the fuel capacity. The results show that if the velocity is larger than a threshold value (e.g. if the velocity is larger than 11 in Figure 11a ), the variation of fuel capacity does not significantly impact the average cost as seen by the absence of dark regions. We acknowledge that the fuel capacity is very important for the vehicle endurance, and if the vehicle does not have enough endurance to reach a point on the surveillance area, the preceding discussions on velocity do not become valid. However, the results of this study suggest that long endurance vehicles may not be necessary for persistent surveillance missions if a UAV has sufficiently high velocity and it has enough endurance to reach any point one the mission area. Like the previous figure, we observe that utilizing the replacement policy reduces the average cost and decreases the value of the threshold velocity. After determining the significance of velocity, we then investigate the combined effect of velocity and radius of communication on the average cost, whose contour plots are illustrated in Figures 12a, 12b, 12c , and 12d. The worst case of the average cost is observed when both the velocity and the radius of communication are small (i.e. the black regions on the bottom left of the figures). Different than the previous cases, the average cost is very sensitive to the variations of both design variables. Similar to the previous cases, utilizing the replacement policy increases the area of the small costs on the upper right corner (the white regions). Finally, we observe that the randomized replacement policy causes a reduction in the small cost area on the lower right corner of the Figure 12d The simulation results show that the replacement policy is very influential on the output parameters because of recovering connectivity after any UAV removal. On the other hand, the randomized policy does not significantly contribute to the improvement of the output metrics. Note that a UAV utilizing the randomized policy returns to base with a small probability even though it has not reached a critical fuel threshold. Our initial intention to use this policy was to create some randomization in the overall system behavior. Henceforth, the UAV actions would not become tractable in the presence of an adversary. To capture how randomization affects the mission, we study different randomized policies by varying F th , which is defined as the fuel level triggering the randomization. Note that we assume that F th is equal to nF cr , and if n = 1 the randomized policy becomes identical to the deterministic policy.
As n increases, a UAV has a larger probability to return to base with more fuel. Table 3 illustrates the output parameters based on the deterministic and the randomized replacement policies. As n increases, the average fuel a UAV decides to return to base significantly increases; however, the cost and the utilities are not influenced much until a value of n. Thus, we suppose that if n is tuned properly, effective results can be obtained with the randomized replacement policy. In this paper, the DOE study based on the depicted assumptions shows that the velocity and the radius of communication are the most crucial design variables for a persistent surveillance mission. In addition, it is observed that the fuel consumption ratio influences the output metrics more than the maximum fuel capacity. A very interesting result is the insignificance of the fuel capacity if a limit velocity is sustained. In this manner, the results suggest that if we can design sufficiently fast vehicles that can reach to any point on the surveillance area, then designing long endurance vehicles is not becoming very critical. Due to the nature of the problem, having a connected communication network throughout the mission is very important, so a policy taking into account the connectivity maintenance greatly improves the mission performance. As such, the policies utilizing some replacements to recover connectivity in UAV removal exhibit a better performance than the policies without the replacements. Finally, while the randomized policies do not significantly affect the output metrics as the replacement policies do (e.g. the results of the deterministic replacement and the randomized replacement policies do not vary from each other), they can result in UAVs to behave intractable without any performance loss if the randomization parameter is tuned properly. Note that being intractable becomes beneficial for persistent surveillance missions, where some adversaries are present. In the case of an adversary watching the UAV actions for a sufficient amount of time, the deterministic policies cause the adversary to forecast when the UAV will return to base for refueling, whereas the randomized policies hinder tractability.
V. Conclusion
This paper addresses a law enforcement scenario, where the base representing the ground station of the police forces aims to maximize the recent information gathered from a surveillance area. In order to achieve this objective, the base sends a set of autonomous UAVs to some monitoring points, and the UAVs broadcast the monitored information back to the base through multi-hop communications. Since the base and each UAV have limited communication ranges, the base can collect information only from the UAVs that can communicate with the base either directly or through other vehicles. In this paper, we study some design and control variables that can have potential effect on the mission performance. As the design variables, we consider velocity, fuel capacity, radius of communication, fuel consumption ratio, and time to detect whereas some refuel (i.e. deterministic and randomized) and connectivity (replacement and noReplacement) policies are considered as the control variables. Based on a scenario containing identical UAVs, the most influential design variables are observed as the velocity and the radius of communication. Moreover, the replacement policy greatly improves the mission effectiveness and reduces the influence of the fuel capacity of a UAV on the mission performance.
As a future work of this research, we aim to include more design variables in the DOE study that will also capture the aerodynamic properties of UAVs. Furthermore, we intent to simulate an extended version of the replacement policy, where UAVs may reject a replacement request based on their current operations. Finally, the results of this study are based on some fixed coordinate points. In order to generalize the results of the DOE study, we plan to inspect the presence of ratios between the closest and the furthest point on the surveillance area, and we aim to relate such ratios with the mission performance.
